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We study the impact on a country’s economy of sharing a direct land border with a country 
experiencing  conflict.  Through  analysing  sixty-three major episodes of regional instability 
during  the  period  between  1990 and  2016 by using panel  data  methods  applied  to unre- 
stricted  error correction  model, the opportunity cost of such regional conflict is examined. 
The resulting estimates  of GDP loss are most profound for countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East.  Regional turmoil  resulting  from conflict has been found to have significantly 
reduced  GDP  growth  in Angola,  China,  Kuwait,  Mauritania, Saudi  Arabia,  Sudan  and 
Tanzania, with estimates  ranging  from over 3% to 7% average reductions  in GDP  growth 
rate  using both  pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations (with  an international average of 
0.95% and  1.18% respectively).   This  considerable  opportunity costs of military  expendi- 
ture  raise an important and challenging question  to the concerned governments  about  the 
economic and  social rightfulness  of this  expenditure and  whether  their  people ultimately 
pay the price for the government decisions of increasing military  spending. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Nowadays,  it  is clear  that   regional  instability is not  confined to  a  particular region 
or part  of the  world with  evidence presented  by the  ongoing conflict in Syrial,  Iraq,  and 
Yemen,  the  tensions  on  the  Korean  Peninsula   due  to  threatening behaviour  related  to 
the  North  Korean  ballistic  missile programme,  and  with  tensions  rising  between  Russia 
and  Europe.   Disturbingly regional conflicts seem to have a spillover effect, Corbet  et al. 
[2017] found that  stock  market  volatility  in France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy  and  the  UK 
were  directly  affected  by  the  growing  terror  activities  that   have  been  inspired  by  ISIL 
since 2011.  In this  connected  world, new events  instantaneously appear  in the  news and 
financial markets  across the globe rapidly  reflect these news on the valuations  of securities 
to partially reflect risks including geopolitical risks as well as investor  sentiment. It seems 
sensible to hypothesise  that  incidents  of conflict, especially those of large-scale, should have 
an immediate  material  consequences to financial markets  with  respect  to both  valuations 
and volatility.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Abu-Ghunmi and Larkin [2016] examined  the effect of regional instability on a number 
of measures of economic activity  using Jordan  as the key country  of interest. Their analysis 
serves as a focal point for the development of the international comparison contained  within 
our  selected  methodology.   Jordan was found  to  be an  example  of a country  possessing 
military  spending  and  FDI inflows that  were highly sensitive  to broad  regional conflict in 
the Middle East.  This unfortunate side-effect of necessitating a high level of militarisation 
has resulted  in foregone public investment of between US$12.6 billion and US$22.7 billion, 
which is equivalent to between  40% and  72% of its 2012 level of GDP  and  approximately 
2.5 times that  of its 2005 level of GDP.  This could be thought of as a representation of the 
‘neighbour’s curse’ term of Ades and Chua [1997] which describes the country’s unfortunate 
location of being beside a country  that  suffers turmoil  and chaos generated  by conflict.  In 
fact, Ades and Chua [1997] studied a large set of countries and found the political turmoil in 
neighbouring  countries  negatively  affected the economic growth in a country,  as it resulted 
in  increasing  the  country’s  military  spending  in  addition  to  disrupting its  international 
trade. In this paper  we build upon the work in Abu-Ghunmi and Larkin  [2016]. We examine 
the  impact  that  regional political  instability across the  international community  have  on 
the  concerned  countries’  economies based  on the  largest  international conflicts that  have 
occurred  between  1990 and  2016.  To  this  effect, we have  incorporated sixty-three major 
conflicts as described  in Table  1.  The  economic growth  rates  and  the  GDP  values  that 
are lost to increased military  expenditure as a response to regional conflicts are estimated. 
The results  of such analysis are most relevant to government institutions, economists and 





The remainder  of this paper  is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature, Section 3 presents  the data  and illustrates the methodology,  Section 4 presents the 
findings and discusses the results  , and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Literature on how countries’ economic conditions are affected by the presence of conflict 
and  terrorist activity is rather   extensive.    Wisniewski  [2016] has  produced  a  literature 
survey  of how stock returns  and  politics  are connected,  even though  causality  is difficult 
to discern  in many  cases.  Institutional stability and  quality  also matters for investment, 
with  Buchanan   et  al.  [2012] finding  that   improving  institutional quality  by  1 standard 
deviation  boosts  FDI  by 1.69.  When  looking directly  at  war itself,  few financial  market 
event  studies  have  been  conducted  but  work by Hudson  and  Urquhart [2015] illustrates 
the  importance of military  events  and  their  outcomes  on a country’s  stock  markets  and 
the relative efficiency between jurisdictions. Efobi and Asongu [2016] find evidence, using a 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique  based on forward orthogonal  deviations 
as well as a quantile regressions (QR) estimation technique,  that  conflict in Africa, particularly 
terrorism,  induces capital  flight from African economies. 
Conflict situations and economic conditions  are also reflexive. Martin  et al. [2008] find 
that  while the simple correlation  illustrates that  the more open the economy the less likely 
international conflict is to take  place, that  is not  the  case when controlled  for the  effects 
of globalisation.   Martin  et  al. [2008]’s results  find the  opposite  result  to  what  would be 
expected,  with  countries  in close proximity  having  a 21% in conflict  probability due  to 
globalisation  effects.  "...even  in a model where trade  increases welfare and  war is Pareto 
dominated  by peace, higher  trade  flows may not  lead to more peaceful relations.   Indeed, 
what  matters ultimately is the  geographical  structure of trade  and  its  balance  between 
bilateral  and  multilateral openness.   Bilateral  trade,  because  it increases the  opportunity 
cost of bilateral  war, deters  bilateral  war.  Multilateral trade  openness, because it reduces 
this  opportunity cost with  any  given country,  weakens the  incentive  to make concessions 
during  negotiations  to avert  escalation  and  therefore  increases  the probability of war be- 
tween any given pair of country.  From this point of view, an increase in trade  between two 
countries pacifies relations between those but increases the probability of conflict with third 
countries." [Martin  et  al., 2008, p894].  The  counterpoint  to this  result  is the  importance 
of bilateral  trade  flows in preventing  conflicts, placing more importance on regional trade 
agreements  over multilateral global trade  as a source of geopolitical stability. 
The  standard understanding of global  investment patterns is that   capital  seeks the 
highest yield given there are no capital  constraints. The work by Younas [2015] shows that 
the  Feldstein  and  Horioka [1980] paradox  holds.  Their  analysis finds that  terrorist events 
drive savings out from the developing economies to the developed and also concludes that 
investment in developing countries  are damaged  by terrorist events . In a further  study  of 
102 countries  by [Procasky and Ujah, 2016] looks at how price of sovereign debt is changed 





results  in a negative  change in outlook on sovereign bonds and the resulting  downgrade  of 
the credit rating  of sovereign debt is higher in developing countries  compared  to developed 
countries  .   It  is clear  from earlier  work by  Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016] and  others 
that  investment  is negatively  impacted  upon  by conflict.   But what  about  the  potential 
for military  and  security  expenditure having  a positive  impact  on the  economy  through 
domestic stimulus,  an idea dating  back to Kalecki [1943]?. Even though,  Dakurah  et al. 
[2001] found military  expenditure did not seem to have an effect on economic growth.  Deger 
and  Smith  [1983] pointed  out that  reduction  in savings induces opportunity cost due to that  
forgone investment and  this  explains the theoretical adverse  impact  of military  expenditure 
on economic growth.    The  authors  also reported that  the negative  impact  on economic 
growth  materializes  when military  spending impact on  savings  prevails  its  good  impact  of 
modernization.   On  another   theoretical   ground, Aizenman  and  Glick  [2006] found  
economic  growth  has  shown  a non-linear  relationship with  military  expenditure.   On  the  
one hand  they  found  direct  evidence  that  economic  growth in countries  located in the 
Middle East  is negatively  affected by military  spending. On  the  other  hand  they  found  
there  is a threshold  level to  external  threat that  affects the  relationship, above this  level 
the  impact  of military  expenditure on economic growth is positive,  while below this  level 
the  impact  is negative.   The  authors  also documented a role for corruption concerning  
how military  expenditure affects economic growth;  when corruption  is high the  impact  is 
negative  while in low corruption  environment the  impact is positive.  Further evidence was 
reported  by Abu-Bader  and Abu-Qarn  [2003] who found that threats, whether  domestic or 
regional, have driven military  expenditure which in turn  resulted  in a negative  impact  on 
economic growth in a number  of countries  in the Middle East.  Chen et al. [2014] presented  
evidence that  private  investment, in low and middle income countries,  is crowded out by 
military  expenditures  with the consequences of reducing economic growth, while in high 
income countries  the  Keynesian  effect prevails  with  military  expenditure enhancing  
economic growth. Furthermore, Bove and Nisticò [2014] examined,  using panel data  
techniques,  whether  military  intervention in politics  has an impact  on defence spending.   
The  authors  found the greater  the involvement of military  in policy-making , the greater  the 
possibility of military spending as a percentage  of GDP. 
Chang et al. [2011] carried out Arellano  and Bond [1991] dynamic panel data  estimation 
technique on 90 countries during the period from 1992 to 2006 and found that  in low-income 
countries  as well as in three of the four investigated regions; Europe,  Middle East,  in addi- 
tion to South Asia, economic growth is negatively  driven by military  expenditure, however, 
the relationship  is more significant for the regions than  for the low-income countries.  Also 
using dynamic  panel data  analysis on a number of countries  that  exceeded 130 countries  and 
over a period  of time  extended  from 1963 to 2000 Töngür  et al. [2015] reported  military 
expenditures is negatively  related  to  economic growth.   They  highlighted two important 
issues within their findings related  to political regimes and income inequality.  The authors 
emphasized  the  importance of political  regimes in the  amount of military  spending  and 
confirmed that  the level of democracy negatively  relates to military  spending.  In addition, 





Alptekin and Levine [2012] found military  spending is positively related to economic growth 
in developed countries.  In addition,  they reported  a non-linear  relationship  which they ex- 
plained to indicate that  military  expenditure positively relates to economic growth, however 
after certain  point the increasing military  expenditure results in a higher opportunity cost 
that  causes the relationship  to change into negative.  Interestingly, Gupta  et al. [2014] em- 
phasized  the importance of investment quality  in determining the impact  of public capital 
on economic growth. Khalifa et al. [2017] studied what effect, global financial crises along with 
geopolitical instability, have on oil-rich countries, using a spillover Asymmetric Multiplicative 
Error Model. They found that oil prices, natural gas prices and petroleum-based stock markets are 
significantly affected by these event. In the aftermath of the same crisis, Batuo et al. [2018] 
examined the impact that the financial liberalisation and financial development have on economic 
growth and financial stability and found that financial instability is reduced by economic growth. 
Further, when considering the assets that are traditionally used during periods of crises, Zhu et al. 
[2018] showed that during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, gold acted as a hedge in the 
UK stock market. Further, when considering agricultural commodity markets, Fernandez-Diaz and 
Morley [2019] found structural changes in the correlations between the returns of crude oil prices 
and the GSCI index and all the studied macroeconomic variables and the structural changes 
accompanied the 2008 financial crisis. Their results showed that there is volatility spillover 
between maize and crude oil, which could be due to an increasing interdependence between the 
two markets that resulted from introducing biofuel policies. In addition, Ben Salah Mahdi and 
Boujelbene Abbes [2018] found that capital and risk are positively related in Islamic banks with a 
bidirectional relationship, while Ben Rejeb [2017] suggested that Islamic finance seems not able 
to protect from financial and economic shocks that impact conventional markets. Arnold and 
Soederhuizen [2018] found that liquidity uptake and bank instability are positively related when 
they studied the relationship between the European banking industry’s stability and ECB 
refinancing operations during the financial crisis. 
Using firm-level data,  Chen  [2017] and  Oh and  Oetzel  [2017] found that  conflicts not 
necessarily  affect economy negatively.   They  showed that  experience  in conflict zone and 
national  resources  are important factors.   They  reported  an  improvement in FDI  perfor- 
mance as the experience of companies to operate in conflicts zones gets better. In fact these 
authors  provide support  to the theory that conflict not always have negative impact  on the 
economy, rather  the conflict itself through  a number  of idiosyncratic  factors  play a role in 
determining  the  impact  on the  economy.  The  findings  are in agreement with  the  researchers  
of armed  conflict argument  that  not  all armed  conflicts negatively affect the economy and 
the state  and  that a country’s involvement in an armed  conflict could be taken as a positive  
indicator  of a country’s available resources or its capacity  (Oh  and  Oetzel [2017]). Caution  
should be taken  here as this study  focused on firms with headquarters in the UK and on 
extraterritorial  conflicts. 
There  is also evidence of direct  effects at both  the country-specific  and regional levels. 
Manamperi  [2016] used a modified Barro model to examine how economic growth in two of 
NATO countries;  Turkey and Greece that  are characterised by higher spending on military; 





growth  is not  affected by military  spending,  military  spending  has an adverse  impact  on 
Turkey’s economic growth.  However, Sulvanathan and Sulvanathan [2014] found economic 
growth in Sri Lanka is driven by defence expenditure and the relationship  is unidirectional. 
They argued that  considering that  Sri Lanka has suffered from civil war for 30 years, such 
finding is unique.   Looking to  the  impact  of war on economy using different dimensions, 
Serneels and  Verpoorten  [2013] found  that  in Rwanda,  the  more intense  the  conflict the 
worse the impact  on households consumption which was in comparison  found to lag years 
behind.   They  also reported  that  return  to  two factors;  labour  and  land  are  affected  by 
conflict  intensity.   In  the  Republic  of Korea,  Yang  et  al.  [2015] examined  the  effect an 
increase in military  expenditure would have on the economy and found that  to have better 
effect on GDP then indirect  tax rate should be raised while for gross output, the solution is 
increasing corporate income tax.  Wang et al. [2012] examined the effect of military spending 
on the  members  of the  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development organization  using the 
Malmquist  productivity index.  The authors  documented  a higher economic productivity is 
associated  with defence expenditure. 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
 
3.1.  Data 
Annual  observations   for  the  period  1990-2016 were  obtained   for  the  following vari- 
ables1.    General  government  total  expenditure  in  each  national   currency  was  obtained 
from World  Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  Subject  Code  in April  2017 taken  directly  from 
the  WEO  database2; General  government  final consumption expenditure (current  LCU)- 
the difference between these two variables is taken to be the government capital expenditure 
; Military expenditure (current LCU); Military expenditure (as a percentage of GDP); GDP 
(current  US$); GDP  (curreny  LCU); Foreign  direct  investment, net  inflows (BoP,  current  
US$); FDI  net  inflows as a percentage  of GDP  and  Household  consumption  expenditure 
per capital  (constant 2010 US$) obtained  from the world development indicators3. 
Our  sample then  utilises a broad  number  of sixty-three international periods of crises 
in regions located  within  the confines of active armed  conflict. These conflicts are listed in 
Table 1. The identification of these crisis periods enables two specific avenues  of research:   
1) we can  investigate  the  direct  consequences  of armed  conflict  in terms  of the opportunity 
cost to the country  in which the conflict occurred; and 2) we can investigate  the  direct  
consequences of armed  conflict upon  countries  who share  a border with a country  in the 





                                                          
1 Data for a few of the  variables began  in the  years  shortly after  1990 and  possess  start years  based  on 
availability  






3.2.  Methodology 
3.2.1.  Interrupted time series model 
In principle this paper follows Anderton and Carter  [2001], and uses the multiple  inter- 
rupted  time  series analysis  of  Lewis-Beck and  Alford [1980] to study  the  impact  of armed 
conflicts  or wars  on the  economies of countries  whose neighbours  are  experiencing  such 
conflicts, as follows: 
 
ln(EconomicActivityit) = β0 + β1 ∗ T ri + β2 ∗ W Lit + β3 ∗ W Tit 








i is ith  country  and  ranges  from 1 to N  and  t is time  measured  in years that  ranges 
from 1 to T ; For each country  i ; the following variables are defined ln(EconomicActivity) 
is the natural logarithm  of an economic activity  measure;  T r : is a trend  takes  number  1 
for the  first year in the  series and  continues  as 2, 3, etc.  until  the  end of the  time  series; 
W Lt  :  war level is a dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of 0 for each year  before the 
start of the armed conflict or war in a neighbouring  country and 1 for each year during war 
and for each year afterwards;  W Tt  : war trend  takes the value of 0 for each year before the 
start of war in a neighbouring  country  and  then  1,2,3, etc.  for the  years during  and after 
the war up to the end of the time series; P Lt: peace level is a dummy  variable  that  takes 
the  value of 0 for each year during  and  before the  start of war in a neighbouring  country 
and 1 for each year after the end of the war; P Tt:  peace trend  takes the value of 0 for each 
year before and during  war and then  1,2,3, etc.  for the years after the end of the war.  For 
wars the  start and  end in the  same calendar  year;  W Tt:  war trend  and  P Lt: peace level 
are dropped  out of equation  (1) and  P Tt:  peace trend  is re-defined to take the  value of 0 
for each year before the start of war in a neighbouring  country  and then  1,2,3 etc.  for the 
years during and after the end of the war (according to Anderton and Carter  [2001], the last 
modification  results  in a model similar to the  model used by Barbieri  and  Levy [1999] for 
short wars).  β0  is the intercept coefficient that  represents  the level of the economic activity 
before war;  β1   is the  trend  coefficient that  captures  the  rate  of growth  of the  economic 
activity  before the  war;  β2   is war  level coefficient  which  captures  the  impact  of war  on 
the level of the economic activity  and β3  is war trend  coefficient which measures the effect 
of war on the  rate  of growth  of the  economic activity;  β4  is peace level coefficient which 
captures  the  effect of war end on the  level of the  economic activity;  β5  is the peace trend 
coefficient which measures  the  impact of war end on the  rate  of growth  of the  economic 
activity. 
Anderton and Carter  [2001] used ordinary least square method and maximum likelihood, 
however,  as this  study  uses panel  data,  equation  (1) is estimated as a fixed effect model 
to account  for unobserved  individual  differences between  countries  which are assumed  to 
be time-constant following (Allison.  1994, (p.183)).  Data  dictates  that  some countries have 
experienced  separate  periods of conflicts in neighbouring  countries.  (Allison.  1994, (p.183)) 
point out that  when repeated  events have immediate  and persistent effects however the  effects 
are  not  uniform  then  separate  dummies  are  constructed for each  of the events.   Therefore,  
as the  data  dictates  that  many  countries  have experienced  conflicts in neighbouring  countries  
in separate  periods  of time,  countries  are  grouped  based  on the number  of war and peace 
variables  that  were constructed for each country.  War and peace variables  range  from 
covering  a short  war  that  ended  in one year  to  three  separate  war periods.   Furthermore, 
some war periods  last  until  the  end  of the  time series leaving  no room for peace variables. 
 
 







Tables 2 through 7 report  the results of the multiple interrupted time series models that 
have been selected to add  robustness  to our reported  results.  The selected methodologies 
specifically investigate:   i) foreign direct  investment as a % of GDP;  ii) GDP  in US$; iii) 
government  capital  expenditure as a % of GDP;  iv) household  consumption per capital; 
and v) military  expenditure as a % of GDP;  all economic activity  measures  are in natural 
logarithm.    As in Anderton  and  Carter  [2001] and  Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016], the 
coefficient of interest  is that  related  to the variable  representing War  Level. 
 
3.2.2.  Unrestricted error  correction modelling 
This paper  follows Arunatilake et al. [2001] who used the unrestricted error correction 
model to estimate  the  impact  of military  expenditure on government capital  expenditure, 
we use the  approach  however, we apply  the  panel error correction  model (Sjölander  et al. 
[2017]) as this  study  uses panel  data.   Similarly,  unit  root  tests  are applied  in the  panel 
data  context  to test for the stationarity of the time series4: 
 
DGovCapGDPit = α0  + α1MiExpGDP(it−1) + α2DMilExpGDP(it) + α3FDIGDP(it−1) 
+ α4DFDIGDP(it) + α5GovCapGDP(it−1) + α6MergedBorDumit 
(2) 
 
i is ith  country  that  ranges  from 1 to N  and  t is time  measured  in years that  ranges 
from 1 to T ; For each country  i ; the following variables  are defined, DGovCapGDPt  and 
GovCapGDP(t−1)  represent the difference in government capital  expenditure as a percent- 
age of GDP at time t and government capital  expenditure as a percentage of GDP at time 
t-1, respectively.  MiExpGDP(t−1)  and DMilExpGDP(t)  represent military  expenditure as a 
percentage  of GDP  at  time  t-1  and  the  difference in military  expenditure as a percentage  
of GDP at  time  t, respectively.  FDIGDP(t−1) and DFDIGDP(t) represent foreign direct  
investment as a percentage  of GDP  at time t-1 and difference in foreign direct  investment 
as a percentage  of GDP at time t, respectively.  M ergedBorDumt is a dummy variable that  
takes the value of one for each year that  experienced war in a neighbouring  country  and zero 
otherwise. 
Equation  (2) is estimated using pooled OLS with Arellano and Bond [1991] panel cluster 
standard errors  which  are  robust  to  heteroscedasticity and  serial  correlation  (Vogelsang 
[2012]) and then estimated as fixed effect model to account for the endogeneity problem that 
results  from the  potential correlation  between  the  unobserved  effects and  the  explanatory 
variables  (Wooldridge  [2002]; Semykina and Wooldridge [2010]). 
 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
 
                                                          
4 Unit root test  showed that all variables; government capital expenditure as percentage of GDP, military 
expenditure as percentage of GDP  and  foreign  direct  investment  as percentage of GDP, have  integration 





Table 8 reports  the results for the described unrestricted error correction  model for the 
entire  sample  of countries  using both  a pooled OLS and  fixed effect one way estimates. 
Arunatilake et al. [2001] and Abu-Ghunmi and Larkin  [2016], who followed them,  pointed 
out  when the  studied  variables  are found  to  be non-stationary using augmented Dickey- 
Fuller  (ADF)  test,  there  is a risk of obtaining  spurious  relationships and  hence to  avoid 
such risk unrestricted error  correction  modelling can be used.   Therefore,  following these 
recommendations, the  ADF  test  is used to examine  the  stationarity of the  variables  and 
the unrestricted error correction  model is used to estimate  Equation  (2). 
 
3.2.3.  Measuring  the indirect  cost to the economy:  i.e.  opportunity  costs 
To calculate  the effect of military  expenditure on economic growth; i.e. the output lost 
due  to  increasing  military  spending,  the paper  follows the  approach  previously  used  by 
Arunatilake et al. [2001] and Abu-Ghunmi and Larkin [2016] as follows: 
 
1.  Equation  (2) is used to estimate  the impact  on government investment of increasing 
military  spending.  
2.  The  incremental  capital  output ratio  (ICOR)  is calculated  for each country  and  for 
each  year.   The  ICOR  approach  is in  fact  the  Comparative Static  Harrod-Domar 
model of Grobar  and  Gnanaselvam [1993] as indicated  by Arunatilake et  al.  [2001] 
and  is calculated  by dividing  the  investment as a percentage  of GDP  by the  GDP 
growth rate. 
3.  Then the ICOR is used to estimate  the drop in GDP growth due to military  spending 
and the lost GDP  for each country  for each year. 
4.  A 2% rate of return, which is similar to the rate of return  on FDI inflows as reported 
by OECD  [2013] and  used by Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016], is also used in this 
paper  to calculate  the future  value of the lost GDP  as of 2016. 
 
 
4.  Discussion of results 
 
4.1.  The Crisis  Zone Impact  on Economic  activities 
Table  7 reports  the  results  of estimating multiple  interrupted time  series models for 
each of a number of economic activity  measures5. The estimated coefficients in each model 
represent the following; the intercept measures the economic activity  level before the crisis, 
that  has been caused by the selected conflicts, begins; the Trend  variable  coefficient shows 
the economic activity  growth rate before the crisis begins.; the coefficients on war level and 
peace level measure the impact  of war and war end, respectively,  on the economic activity 
level; the  coefficients on war trend  and  peace trend  measure  the  impact  of war and  war 
end, respectively  , on economic activity  growth rate  (Anderton and Carter  [2001]). 
With  regards  to  GDP,  the results  show that  level of GDP  as well as its  growth  rate 
fell in  the  period  after  the  crisis,  in  the  studied  countries,   had  begun.    However,  after 
the  conclusion  of war,  GDP  shows reversion  to  its  pre-conflict  levels .   Interestingly, 
                                                          





military  expenditure measured  as a percentage  of GDP  is found  to  increase  during  the 
period of crisis in the analysed  countries.  Of interest  however, is the observation  that  this 
military  spending shows no reversion in trend  in the period thereafter. Government capital 
expenditure measured  as a percentage  of GDP has declined during episodes of conflict, but 
is found once the war period concluded there is evidence of some restoration in government 
capital  spending.   Finally,  the  growth  rate  of foreign direct  investment as a percentage  of 
GDP  is found to be negative  indicating  fall in this  economic activity  during  the  studied 
crises periods.  Nevertheless,  there  is evidence of an increase in the  level of foreign direct 
investment after the conflict has been resolved. 
Table 8 shows strong evidence that  government capital investments is negatively affected 
by government’s  military  expenditure, which is consistent with the findings of Arunatilake 
et  al. [2001] and  Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016] who found  that  government capital  in- 
vestment can be crowded out by military  spending.  Using both  pooled OLS and fixed one  
way estimates, we can identify  strong  negative  relationships  for the  measures  of military 
expenditure as a percentage  of GDP6. 
 
4.2.  The Indirect  Cost of Crisis  Zone to Economy:  Opportunity  Costs 
We now turn  the  discussion to the  indirect  costs borne by a country  as a result  of its 
position  within  a conflict zone.  Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016] showed that  a country’s 
location  indeed matters. In order to measure  such economic opportunity costs that  result 
from investment lost to increasing  military  spending  by the  government, both  pooled and 
fixed effect estimates  were utilized  with outliers  excluded  and  value measured  as of 2016, 
US$).  Tables  9 and 10 present the results  of these estimates. 
 
 
Insert Tables 9 and 10  about here 
 
 
Tables  9 and 10 report  the estimates  of the country’s  average ICOR,  the average drop 
in government capital  expenditure as a percentage  of GDP as a result of increasing military 
spending and the average drop in GDP  growth rate  in the same period.  In addition  to the 
country’s  average estimated loss of GDP  during  the sample period and the sum of the future 
values of yearly lost GDP measured  as of 2016 . Using the pooled OLS methodology, it is 
found that  government capital  expenditure as a proportion  of GDP falls by an average of 
1.16% in countries that  are located in a crisis zone . Similarly, GDP growth rate is found to 
fall by 0.95%. The fixed effects estimations provide similar estimates  of 1.37% and 1.18% 
decreases in the same measures respectively.  Including  all countries  within  the investigated 
sample,  the pooled OLS methodology  estimates  that  $135 billion of average GDP  was lost 
while the  sum of lost GDP  due to crises generated  by conflict, taking  time value of money 
                                                          
6 Abu-Ghunmi and  Larkin  [2016] carried   out  a  robustness check  of this  possible  negative impact  on capital 
formation using  five countries of the  world  top  ten  peaceful  countries according to  the  2014 world survey  of 
the  Institute for Economics  and  Peace.   They  show that this  result  is not  broadly found.  the  five peaceful  





into account at only 2 % rate of return  , accounted  for $247.470 trillion.  The fixed effect 
estimations presented  results  of $162 billion and $298.127 trillion respectively. 
Table  9 shows countries  with significant deteriorations of the  level of government cap- 
ital  to  GDP  ratios  include  Angola  (-2.27%),  Djibouti  (-2.26%),  Israel  (-3.27%),  Jordan 
(-2.32%),  Kuwait  (-4.97%),  Oman  (-5.01%),  Saudi  Arabia  (-3.95%)  and  the  Republic  of 
Yemen (-2.24%).  While the pooled OLS results are presented,  similar results are portrayed 
using  the  fixed effects estimation methodology.    The  largest  average  decreases  in  GDP 
growth  occurred  in Angola (2.43%),  Burkina  Faso  (2.55%),  China  (4.00%),  Georgia  ( 
2.22%), Kuwait  (3.17%).   Mauritania (2.93%),  Oman  (2.17%),  Saudi  Arabia  (5.83%), 
Sudan  (3.66%) and Tanzania (6.23%).  While considering both  average estimated loss of 
GDP  and the  sum of GDP  losses as its value in 2016 measured  using 2 % rate  on return. 
China presents  itself as the most significantly economically exposed nation  due to military 
expenditure in both categories with $6.000 trillion yearly average GDP loss which amounts 
to a total  loss, as of 2016, of $134.019 trillion.  China  is followed by Saudi Arabia  ($1.028 
trillion  average GDP  loss and $37.444 trillion  total  GDP  loss), India  ($494 billion average 
GDP loss and $14.472 trillion GDP loss), Russia ($404 billion average GDP loss and $10.404 
trillion total  GDP loss) and the United  Arab Emirates  ($265 billion average GDP loss and 
$5.395 total  GDP  loss) respectively.  Batuo et al. (2018) found that financial instability is 
reduced by economic growth, if this effect is considered here then it could be argued that 
the lost economic growth in countries located in crisis zone due to military spending might 
have also impacted negatively financial stability in these countries and hence worsen the 
economic situation.  
 
 
Insert Figures 1 through 4 about here 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present evidence of the country’s average estimated loss of GDP and the 
sum of GDP  loss as of 2016 respectively  for the  pooled OLS methodology.   Figures  3 and 
4 present evidence of the same measures of GDP  for fixed effects estimation. The darkest 
shades  represent  those  nations  that  have lost the  most  in terms  of GDP,  with  clear signs 
of the stresses placed on countries in the Middle East,  Asia and Africa.  China,  India, Iran, 
Iraq,  Pakistan, Russia,  Saudi  Arabia,  Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey  and  the  United  Arab 
Emirates  are found to be the countries who have lost the most GDP throughout the sample 
period between 1990 and 2016. 
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
It  is clear  that economies  of countries  located  in  crisis  zones,  even  if they  are  not 
experiencing  military  actions  within  their  territory, are substantially adversely  affected by 
increasing  military  spending.    Capital   investment  is crowded  out  by  military  spending. 
It  should  be noted  that  the  overall  GDP  losses generated  by  conflict  of 1.18% to  place 





approximately equate  to two-thirds  of 2016 US GDP.  The  total  losses of $298.127 trillion 
is equal almost to four times the  size of global 2016 GDP  at  current US dollars according  to the 
World Bank. The aim of this study was to build upon the work of Abu-Ghunmi and Larkin 
[2016] and calculate  the global losses generated  by military  conflict.  While there are 
discussions about the idea of military  Keynesian, a concept first outlined  by Michael Kalecki 
in his "Political Aspects of Full Employment" in the  Political  Quarterly  in 1943 as an 
explanation of why Germany’s economy recovered during the Nazi period (Kalecki [1943]). 
Our work illustrates that  from a global and national  point of view military  Keynesian  is a 
myth.  Further work is required  to  look at  the  impact  of cultural  and  political  economy 
structure to  look for differences in responses  to conflict zones and  the  overall  effect on 
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Table  1: Selected  international periods  of crisis generated by conflict 
 















War in Somalia 
 
Somalia 
1991 2002 Algerian Civil  War Algeria 2009 Ongoing Sudanese nomadic conflicts Sudan 
1991 1995 Croatian War of Independence Croatia 2009 Ongoing South Yemen insurgency Yemen 
1991 1993 Georgian Civil  War Georgia 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Bahrain 
1991 1991 Uprisings in Iraq Iraq 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Egypt 
1991 2002 Sierra Leone  Civil  War Sierra Leone 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Jordan 
1992 1996 Civil  war  in Afghanistan Afghanistan 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Kuwait 
1992 1995 Bosnian War Bosnia 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Lebanon 
1992 1994 Croat Bosniak War Croatia 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Libya 
1993 2005 Burundian Civil  War Burundi 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Morocco 
1993 1993 1993 Russian constitutional crisis Russia 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Oman 
1994 1997 Iraqi  Kurdish Civil  War Iraq 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Saudi  Arabia 
1994 1994 1994 civil war  in Yemen Yemen 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Sudan 
1996 2001 Civil  war  in Afghanistan Afghanistan 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Syria 
1996 1997 First Congo  War Congo 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Tunisia 
1996 2006 Nepalese Civil  War Nepal 2010 Ongoing Arab Spring Yemen 
1997 1997 Albanian  Rebellion of Albania 2011 2014 Iraqi  insurgency Iraq 
1997 1997 Cambodia Cambodia 2011 2011 Libyan Civil  War Libya 
1997 1999 Republic of the  Congo  Civil  War Congo 2011 2014 Factional violence  in Libya Libya 
1998 2003 Second  Congo  War Congo 2011 Ongoing Ethnic violence  in South Sudan Sudan 
1998 1999 Kosovo  War Kosovo 2011 Ongoing Syrian Civil  War Syria 
1998 Ongoing Al Qaeda insurgency in Yemen Yemen 2011 Ongoing Syrian Civil  War spillover in Lebanon Syria 
1999 2003 Second  Liberian Civil  War Liberia 2012 2015 Northern Mali  conflict Mali 
2003 2011 Iraq  War Iraq 2014 2016 2014 Israel  Gaza  conflict Gaza 
2004 Ongoing War in North West Pakistan Pakistan 2014 2014 2014 Israel  Gaza  conflict Israel 
2004 2015 Houthi insurgency in Yemen Yemen 2014 Ongoing Libyan Civil  War Libya 
2006 2007 Sectarian violence  in Iraq Iraq 2014 Ongoing Russian invasion Russia 
2006 2006 2006 Lebanon War Lebanon 2014 Ongoing Russian invasion Ukraine 
2006 2009 War in Somalia Somalia 2015 Ongoing ISIL  insurgency in Tunisia Tunisia 
2008 2009 Gaza  War Gaza 2015 Ongoing Kurdish Turkish conflict Turkey 
2008 2008 Russo  Georgian war Georgia 2015 Ongoing Yemen Yemen 
2008 2008 Russo  Georgian war Russia     


















Table  2: Multiple Interrupted Time  Series for Foreign  Direct Investment as a % of GDP (ln) 
 

















 (0.0025) (0.0179) (0.0080) (<.0001) (0.4064) (<.0001) (0.1681) 
Trend 0.1293 0.1198 0.0951 -0.2203 -0.1057 0.1720 -0.2912 
 (0.0372) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0756) (0.6163) (0.3554) (0.2599) 
War  Level 1 -0.3412 -0.4470 0.4982 1.5606 -1.6087 -0.1247 1.5600 
 (0.1874) (0.0185) (0.5307) (0.0002) (0.0443) (0.7604) (<.0001) 
War  Trend 1  -0.0748 -0.1631 0.2830  -0.0927  
  (0.0005) (0.5539) (0.0222)  (0.6232)  
Peace  Level 1   -0.0483 0.9368  0.6863  
   (0.8985) (0.0003)  (0.0187)  
Peace  Trend 1 -0.0988   -0.0610 0.2280 -0.0843 0.4068 
 (0.1171)   (0.1188) (0.3144) (0.1218) (0.1164) 
War  Level 2     -0.4968 0.4687 -0.2058 
     (0.4599) (0.1128) (0.3618) 
War  Trend 2     0.0538 0.0447  
     (0.4516) (0.3892)  
Peace  Trend 2       -0.1935 
       (0.0002) 
War  Level 3       -0.1583 
       (0.6879) 
War  Trend 3       -0.0154 
       (0.9388) 
Note:  This  table  reports the  results  of the  multiple interrupted time-series model estimated as a 
fixed-effect model for FDI  as a percentage of GDP  (ln).  P-values are shown in parentheses. War 



















Table  3: Multiple Interrupted Time  Series for Gross  Domestic Product (US$)  (ln) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 23.0354 22.0866 21.9005 23.0467 23.1107 25.6688 24.8203 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Trend 0.1532 0.0859 0.0622 0.0265 0.0511 -0.0280 -0.1000 
 (<.0001) 0.1082 (<.0001) 0.2516 0.1038 0.4951 0.1733 
War  Level 1 -0.3065 -0.0001 0.2787 -0.2495 0.0763 -0.0039 -0.5224 
 (0.0082) (0.9998) (0.2109) (0.0022) (0.4969) (0.9716) (<.0001) 
War  Trend 1  0.0169 -0.0652 0.0193  0.0665  
  (0.9071) (0.3967) (0.4025)  (0.1119)  
Peace  Level 1   0.0373 0.2852  0.2813  
   (0.8902) (<.0001)  (0.0003)  
Peace  Trend 1 -0.0493  0.0419 -0.0106 0.0245 0.1868  
 (0.0579)  (<.0001) (0.7469) (0.0763) (0.0115)  
War  Level 2     -0.3350 0.0797 0.3432 
     (0.0010) (0.2996) (<.0001) 
War  Trend 2     0.0717 0.0214  
     (<.0001) (0.0947)  
Peace  Trend 2       -0.0301 
       (0.1022) 
War  Level 3       0.0854 
       (0.5582) 
War  Trend 3       -0.1762 
       (0.0068) 
Note:   This  table  reports the  results  of the  multiple interrupted  time-series model  estimated as a 
fixed-effect model for GDP  (ln).  P-values are shown in parentheses. War  and peace time dummies 


















Table  4:  Multiple Interrupted Time  Series  of Government  Capital Expenditure as a % of GDP 
(ln) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 2.4624 2.8168 1.3270 2.9794 2.7673 3.0124 3.2802 
 (0.5339) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Trend 0.0728 -0.0103 0.0550 -0.0233 0.0642 -0.0417 -0.0519 
 (0.9019) (0.0371) (0.0025) (0.8221) (0.0136) (0.5848) (0.5412) 
War  Level 1 0.0606 -0.0057 0.5112 -0.1011 -0.2591 -0.1325 -0.1916 
 (0.8663) (0.9362) (0.2314) (0.7231) (0.0063) (0.4610) (0.1092) 
War  Trend 1  0.0594 -0.2206 0.0109  0.0419  
  (<.0001) (0.1742) (0.9165)  (0.5875)  
Peace  Level 1   0.1225 -0.0256  0.0737  
   (0.8245) (0.8264)  (0.4976)  
Peace  Trend 1 -0.0757   0.0375 -0.0529 0.0241 0.0569 
 (0.8981)   (0.0557) (0.0518) (0.2330) (0.5033) 
War  Level 2     -0.2507 0.1637 0.2589 
     (0.0023) (0.1270) (<.0001) 
War  Trend 2     0.0256 -0.0451  
     (0.0014) (0.0140)  
Peace  Trend 2       -0.0299 
       (0.0251) 
War  Level 3       0.0464 
       (0.6547) 
War  Trend 3       0.0118 
       (0.7986) 
Note:   This  table  reports the  results  of the  multiple interrupted  time-series model  estimated as 
a fixed-effect model  for government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP  (ln).  P-values are 
shown  in parentheses. War and  peace time  dummies  are generated based  on the  methodology 



















Table  5: Multiple Interrupted Time  Series of Household Consumption per Capita (ln) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 5.9968 6.5281 6.3308 6.2075 8.2590 8.4010 6.9063 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Trend 0.0357 0.0326 0.0173 0.0095 0.0105 -0.0186 -0.0299 
 (0.0099) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4185) (0.5600) (0.8048) (0.5747) 
War  Level 1 -0.1269 -0.2783 -0.2216 -0.1040 0.1606 -0.0284 -0.3550 
 (0.0051) (<.0001) (0.0059) (0.0192) (0.0500) (0.6965) (<.0001) 
War  Trend 1  0.0316 0.0573 0.0049  0.0410  
  (<.0001) (0.0368) (0.6779)  (0.5889)  
Peace  Level 1   -0.1181 0.0532  0.0835  
   (0.2153) (0.1052)  (0.0606)  
Peace  Trend 1 0.0068   0.0072 -0.0032 -0.0032 0.0855 
 (0.6201)   (0.1345) (0.8600) (0.6492) (0.1109) 
War  Level 2     -0.1715 0.0736 0.0529 
     (0.0378) (0.0765) (0.3938) 
War  Trend 2     0.0139 -0.0117  
     (0.0436) (0.0633)  
Peace  Trend 2       -0.0199 
       (0.1697) 
War  Level 3       0.0454 
       (0.6489) 
War  Trend 3       -0.0359 
       (0.4225) 
Note:   This  table  reports the  results  of the  multiple interrupted  time-series model  estimated as a 
fixed-effect model  for household consumption per capita  (ln).  P-values are  shown  in parentheses.  War 



















Table  6: Multiple Interrupted Time  Series of Military Expenditure as a % of GDP  (ln) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 1.9850 2.0099 0.6682 0.3566 2.6586 1.5299 1.6495 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0246) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Trend -0.0737 -0.0253 -0.0164 -0.0644 0.0093 -0.0918 -0.1168 
 (0.2626) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0733) (0.6900) (0.0857) (0.2991) 
War  Level 1 -0.6107 0.0978 0.0451 0.2432 -0.0459 -0.1109 -0.3933 
 (0.0416) (0.0324) (0.7062) (0.0673) (0.5900) (0.4271) (0.0104) 
War  Trend 1  0.0137 0.0368 0.0063  0.0760  
  (0.0059) (0.3770) (0.8603)  (0.1639)  
Peace  Level 1   -0.0439 0.0156  -0.0634  
   (0.7640) (0.8522)  (0.4737)  
Peace  Trend 1 0.0555   0.0249 -0.0210 -0.0190 0.1289 
 (0.4134)   (0.0435) (0.4000) (0.2638) (0.2526) 
War  Level 2     -0.1616 0.2082 0.0857 
     (0.0300) (0.0232) (0.3847) 
War  Trend 2     0.0142 0.0011  
     (0.0516) (0.9410)  
Peace  Trend 2       -0.0628 
       (0.0037) 
War  Level 3       0.0207 
       (0.9010) 
War  Trend 3       0.0966 
       (0.1918) 
Note:  This table  reports the results  of the multiple interrupted time-series model estimated as a  
fixed-effect model for military expenditure as a percentage of GDP  (ln).  P-values are shown in 






















Table  7: Multiple Interrupted Time  Series of a Number of Variables (sum 
of dummies) 
 
Variable LGDPCUS LMilExpGDP LGovCapGDP LFDIGDP 
Intercept 22.9444 0.2661 2.7585 -0.9338 
 (<.0001) (0.0501) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Trend 0.0358 -0.0487 0.0009 0.0985 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9444) (<.0001) 
WarLevel -0.0769 0.2038 0.0542 0.0480 
 (0.0359) (<.0001) (0.3829) (0.7773) 
WarTrend 0.0112 0.0044 -0.0148 -0.0536 
 (0.0936) (0.5745) (0.1868) (0.0129) 
PeaceLevel 0.1718 0.0058 0.0658 1.0251 
 (0.0001) (0.9141) (0.3573) (<.0001) 
PeaceTrend 0.0356 0.0136 0.0334 0.0106 
 (<.0001) (0.0152) (<.0001) (0.4708) 
Note:  This table  reports the results  of the multiple interrupted time-series 
model  estimated for a number of economic  variables, as fixed-effect mod- 
els.   LGDP CU S;  represents GDP  (ln);  LMilExpGDP ; represents  mili- 
tary  expenditure as a percentage of GDP  (ln);  LGovCapGDP ; represents 
government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP  (ln).  LFDIGDP 
represents foreign direct  investment as a percentage of GDP. P-values are 
shown  in parentheses.  War  and  peace  time  dummies  are  generated based 


















Table  8: Unrestricted error  correction estimation of the  international government’s capital expenditure model 
Dependent Variable: DGovCapGDP  
Pooled  OLS                                                    Fixed  One Way  Estimates
Variable                                                  Estimate     P-Value     RSE   P -Value      Estimate         P -Value 
 
Intercept 2.82 (<.0001) (<.0001) 7.73 (<.0001) 
MilExpGDP -0.40 (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.47 (<.0001) 
DMilExpGDP -0.28 (<.0001) (0.11) -0.14 (<.0001) 
FDIGDP 0.00 (0.83) (0.89) -0.02 (0.47) 
DFDIGDP -0.04 (0.10) (0.19) -0.03 (0.25) 
GovCapGDP -0.10 (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.29 (<.0001) 
MergedBorDum 0.14 (0.55) (0.62) 0.17 (0.52) 
Note:  This  table  reports the  results  of estimating Equation 2, using UECM,  for a number of countries. DGov- 
CapGDP is the  difference  in government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP  at time  t; GovCapGDP 
is government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP  at time  t-1; MiExpGDP is military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP  at time t-1; and DMilExpGDP is the difference in military expenditure at time t; FDIGDP; 
is foreign  direct  investment as a percentage of GDP  at time  t-1;  DFDIGDP is the  difference  in foreign  direct 
investment as a percentage of GDP  at time  t; MergedBorDum is a dummy variable that takes  the  value  of one 
for each year that experienced war in a neighbouring country and zero otherwise. Source of data used in the esti- 
mation is World  Development Indicators in the  World  Bank  database. RSE  represents robust standard errors. 












































Albania 0.28 -0.75 0.22 1,380,098,576 34,053,100,390 
Angola 1.20 -2.27 2.43 26,801,876,744 771,352,256,602 
Azerbaijan 1.49 -1.30 0.90 8,148,592,311 263,911,737,383 
Belarus 0.68 -0.62 0.22 5,010,464,548 102,741,652,681 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina 2.78 -0.56 0.23 2,013,669,914 35,596,682,547 
Bulgaria 0.29 -0.89 0.58 13,676,375,263 322,660,796,644 
Burkina Faso 0.37 -0.59 2.55 16,710,445,910 246,917,637,957 
Cameroon 1.05 -0.55 0.54 7,622,970,710 162,197,875,371 
Central African Republic -0.15 -0.58 0.51 460,902,208 4,886,315,144 
Chad 0.69 -1.07 0.91 3,876,801,423 97,499,092,213 
China 2.12 -0.78 4.00 5,999,569,163,707 134,019,235,211,756 
Congo,  Rep. 2.20 -1.03 0.59 4,651,131,627 44,514,671,339 
Croatia 1.93 -1.15 0.18 4,860,239,901 139,430,002,851 
Djibouti 1.94 -2.26 1.19 710,777,615 16,831,002,005 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.28 -1.07 0.33 56,577,284,147 941,465,472,052 
Estonia -2.43 -0.67 0.35 3,611,211,616 94,407,981,589 
Finland 2.17 -0.56 0.05 6,818,095,583 213,107,855,527 
Gabon -0.74 -0.60 0.67 4,206,743,164 65,339,933,072 
Georgia 1.31 -1.20 2.22 16,639,538,645 396,964,306,018 
Greece -8.57 -1.16 0.15 18,791,688,485 745,939,983,608 
Guinea -3.19 -0.91 0.16 590,779,977 9,934,149,014 
Hungary 7.83 -0.54 0.13 8,787,542,655 240,297,073,944 
India 1.64 -1.10 0.56 494,120,143,465 14,471,555,214,082 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.95 -1.01 0.99 114,840,754,543 3,658,257,120,187 
Iraq 0.36 -1.10 0.33 2,935,831,821 101,413,445,084 
Israel -1.00 -3.27 0.86 159,880,935,006 3,112,751,911,734 
Jordan 1.95 -2.32 1.61 22,056,098,319 689,563,105,017 
Kazakhstan 0.15 -0.41 0.57 27,865,446,420 536,728,234,980 
Kenya 1.66 -0.63 0.70 16,210,066,434 493,270,398,327 
Kosovo -0.53 -0.26 0.05 240,098,485 1,961,941,587 
Kuwait 0.31 -4.97 3.17 72,119,296,070 2,407,614,839,035 
Lao  PDR -0.02 -0.79 0.25 879,608,509 14,497,725,679 
Latvia -1.40 -0.46 0.37 5,145,835,602 121,607,555,616 
Lebanon 3.03 -1.99 1.66 18,958,752,866 621,820,918,298 
Liberia 2.39 -1.62 0.53 393,449,035 5,475,767,256 
Libya 0.17 -0.93 0.59 18,370,474,005 258,129,102,878 
Lithuania -1.00 -0.41 0.30 5,034,789,115 134,911,997,020 
Mali 0.45 -0.58 -1.33 -23,346,397,480 -419,883,897,235 
Mauritania 0.47 -1.13 2.93 4,179,712,491 44,161,309,619 
Moldova 0.80 -0.19 0.08 234,019,458 5,600,559,350 
Mongolia -0.45 -0.60 0.22 469,421,175 10,953,652,915 
Montenegro 1.40 -0.70 0.28 718,683,276 8,666,778,060 
Morocco 3.48 -1.35 0.82 38,849,052,324 1,328,314,722,182 
Niger -2.48 -0.45 1.00 2,738,912,624 54,752,237,709 
Norway 1.69 -0.75 0.16 32,029,304,223 1,122,540,893,529 
Oman 1.53 -5.01 2.17 56,762,984,105 1,839,873,661,385 
Pakistan -0.19 -1.85 1.48 171,535,108,578 4,681,740,918,061 
Poland -1.15 -0.77 0.21 46,106,966,314 1,317,281,285,183 
































Qatar -0.2 -1.33 1.43 65,840,830,600 711,084,296,892 
Romania 2.47 -0.89 0.33 23,798,651,271 744,178,783,868 
Russian Federation 0.39 -1.56 0.91 403,877,312,015 10,403,606,527,022 
Rwanda 1.98 -1.1 0.76 1,366,265,675 32,657,977,760 
Saudi  Arabia 0.88 -3.95 5.83 1,028,444,872,471 37,443,805,829,566 
Senegal 0.77 -0.63 0.26 1,796,396,989 45,916,511,205 
Serbia 0.67 -1.15 0.56 2,865,109,727 50,262,910,180 
Sierra Leone -0.05 -0.71 1.54 1,682,914,233 33,861,366,306 
Slovak  Republic 1.46 -0.66 0.27 11,147,555,706 315,341,102,485 
Slovenia 3.10 -0.53 0.11 2,966,015,433 79,793,616,890 
Spain 3.83 -0.62 0.11 80,098,045,401 2,796,355,429,109 
Sudan 0.08 -1.33 3.66 58,891,842,248 1,520,793,882,100 
Syrian Arab Republic 3.58 -2.5 1.09 22,116,168,583 483,862,561,806 
Tajikistan 0.04 -0.62 0.88 1,191,638,261 18,413,123,650 
Tanzania 0.43 -0.49 6.23 107,444,984,749 3,123,035,545,310 
Thailand -0.94 -0.67 0.58 129,741,888,115 3,387,387,585,504 
Tunisia 0.87 -0.66 0.33 7,137,551,177 256,044,949,948 
Turkey -5.44 -1.2 0.43 176,064,772,669 3,614,234,395,953 
Turkmenistan 1.18 -1.12 0.15 311,888,540 1,428,161,577 
Uganda -1.19 -0.91 1.07 11,959,191,746 280,141,694,112 
Ukraine 0.35 -1.17 0.04 -4,346,934,044 -82,092,681,220 
United Arab Emirates 1.62 -1.94 1.54 264,850,099,425 5,395,224,446,560 
Uzbekistan 3.65 -0.41 -0.09 -1,498,519,687 -13,688,065,792 
Vietnam 2.70 -1.02 0.49 47,032,591,468 684,768,519,248 













Note:  This  Table  reports the  effect  of Military Expenditure on  economic  growth excluding  outliers. Average  
ICOR  is the country’s average  of ICOR,  yearly  ICOR  for each  country is calculated by  dividing  the  
investment as  a percentage of GDP  by the  GDP  growth  rate;  Ave Drop  GovCapGDP is the drop  in the  
country’s average government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP;  Ave Drop  GDP  growth  is the  
drop  in country’s average  GDP  growth  rate;  Ave Est  Loss GDP  is the  country’s average  estimated loss in 
GDP;  Sum  GDP loss (2016) is the  country’s sum of future value  (2016) of the  lost GDP  and  is calculated 












































Albania 0.28 -0.92 0.25 1,533,141,801 37,941,551,952 
Angola 1.20 -2.77 3.56 32,914,455,903 973,386,195,021 
Azerbaijan 1.49 -1.52 1.01 8,245,703,111 276,726,410,161 
Belarus 0.68 -0.74 0.26 5,887,789,933 120,683,293,083 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina 2.78 -0.69 0.30 2,622,705,504 46,327,232,342 
Bulgaria 0.29 -1.06 0.70 16,528,409,574 389,723,826,889 
Burkina Faso 0.37 -0.71 2.97 19,568,829,427 288,666,408,262 
Cameroon 1.05 -0.64 0.63 9,098,004,588 192,632,316,757 
Central African Republic -0.15 -0.66 0.54 464,750,044 4,690,588,350 
Chad 0.69 -1.25 1.10 4,648,090,779 116,412,214,017 
China 2.12 -0.92 4.67 7,052,731,869,673 157,378,268,723,296 
Congo,  Rep. 2.2 -1.17 0.74 5,757,945,607 55,349,820,905 
Croatia 1.93 -1.42 0.22 5,874,801,674 168,820,037,910 
Djibouti 1.94 -2.68 1.42 848,744,934 20,062,203,620 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.28 -1.27 0.41 68,589,190,102 1,142,624,771,768 
Estonia -2.43 -0.78 0.40 4,200,046,417 109,681,919,435 
Finland 2.17 -0.66 0.06 8,385,277,244 264,406,539,942 
Gabon -0.74 -0.72 0.84 5,516,181,305 84,618,723,211 
Georgia 1.31 -1.41 2.28 17,331,858,769 412,659,893,488 
Greece -8.57 -1.36 0.18 22,550,580,725 893,684,422,302 
Guinea -3.19 -1.07 0.22 764,225,143 13,219,444,400 
Hungary 7.83 -0.64 0.15 10,478,404,743 286,407,520,758 
India 1.64 -1.29 0.66 585,784,310,261 17,155,469,789,854 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.95 -1.18 1.16 138,226,766,262 4,371,593,830,273 
Iraq 0.36 -1.27 0.42 13,907,572,433 237,360,324,101 
Israel -1.00 -3.9 1.04 191,415,795,481 3,730,711,572,759 
Jordan 1.95 -2.75 1.94 26,295,166,506 823,558,165,169 
Kazakhstan 0.15 -0.48 0.66 31,142,894,809 606,398,008,097 
Kenya 1.66 -0.75 0.83 19,231,248,201 585,665,641,137 
Kosovo -0.53 -0.28 0.05 261,251,219 2,140,086,346 
Kuwait 0.31 -6.17 5.71 116,297,100,845 3,961,262,125,310 
Lao  PDR -0.02 -1.01 0.31 1,086,952,890 17,935,399,744 
Latvia -1.4 -0.54 0.43 5,913,611,395 139,800,282,800 
Lebanon 3.03 -2.35 2.07 22,925,201,117 755,364,420,252 
Liberia 2.39 -1.62 0.59 445,185,861 6,178,578,968 
Libya 0.17 -1.14 0.87 26,452,909,322 377,195,769,169 
Lithuania -1.00 -0.47 0.34 5,931,573,153 158,234,627,916 
Mali 0.45 -0.68 -1.58 -27,715,187,679 -498,450,506,143 
Mauritania 0.47 -1.34 3.69 5,469,970,430 57,278,933,323 
Moldova 0.8 -0.23 0.09 257,398,270 6,146,383,252 
Mongolia -0.45 -0.73 0.23 449,302,350 8,645,767,761 
Montenegro 1.40 -0.84 0.35 898,150,669 10,837,920,683 
Morocco 3.48 -1.59 0.98 45,969,546,065 1,577,208,421,725 
Niger -2.48 -0.53 1.20 3,223,327,598 64,669,782,365 
Norway 1.69 -0.89 0.20 39,697,491,264 1,382,950,009,714 
Oman 1.53 -5.9 2.64 69,592,181,348 2,254,496,854,747 
Pakistan -0.19 -2.21 1.79 205,071,180,211 5,605,220,245,804 
Poland -1.15 -0.91 0.25 55,508,754,274 1,580,825,016,939 
Qatar -0.20 -1.57 1.79 81,069,258,895 876,086,902,287 
































Romania 2.47 -1.07 0.41 28,990,683,208 908,690,452,033 
Russian Federation 0.39 -1.83 1.10 540,761,977,984 13,546,894,897,091 
Rwanda 1.98 -1.31 0.82 1,509,979,613 33,763,368,149 
Saudi  Arabia 0.88 -4.67 7.27 1,301,678,932,877 47,139,011,962,573 
Senegal 0.77 -0.75 0.28 1,951,039,148 48,646,957,383 
Serbia 0.67 -1.36 0.81 5,398,176,362 105,599,947,112 
Sierra Leone -0.05 -0.86 1.98 2,142,823,311 43,139,984,985 
Slovak  Republic 1.46 -0.78 0.31 13,281,584,131 373,656,337,760 
Slovenia 3.10 -0.63 0.12 3,489,176,649 93,743,940,483 
Spain 3.83 -0.73 0.13 95,958,509,855 3,346,418,059,383 
Sudan 0.08 -1.54 4.61 71,334,353,864 1,859,018,134,372 
Syrian Arab Republic 3.58 -2.96 1.32 26,964,432,088 589,798,341,721 
Tajikistan 0.04 -0.71 1.04 1,396,838,173 21,570,670,737 
Tanzania 0.43 -0.58 7.38 128,025,077,767 3,719,438,054,073 
Thailand -0.94 -0.8 0.69 153,680,485,528 4,013,241,069,714 
Tunisia 0.87 -0.78 0.40 8,618,341,512 308,069,401,880 
Turkey -5.44 -1.42 0.53 218,263,684,794 4,480,095,510,460 
Turkmenistan 1.18 -1.27 0.18 369,476,264 1,687,077,824 
Uganda -1.19 -1.08 1.36 15,615,639,710 364,478,671,790 
Ukraine 0.35 -1.34 0.06 -2,181,840,186 -34,292,169,742 
United Arab Emirates 1.62 -2.27 1.87 322,428,621,411 6,568,370,739,052 
Uzbekistan 3.65 -0.52 -0.13 -2,141,809,572 -19,689,400,717 
Vietnam 2.70 -1.25 0.58 55,170,656,627 803,447,861,847 













Note:  This  Table  reports the  effect of Military Expenditure on economic  growth  excluding  outliers. Aver- 
age ICOR  is the  country’s average  of ICOR,  yearly  ICOR  for each  country is calculated by  dividing  the 
investment as a percentage of GDP  by  the  GDP  growth  rate;  Ave Drop  GovCapGDP is the  drop  in the 
country’s average  government  capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP;  Ave Drop  GDP  growth  is the 
drop  in country’s average  GDP  growth  rate;  Ave Est  Loss GDP  is the  country’s average  estimated loss in 
GDP;  Sum GDP  loss (2016)  is the  country’s sum of future value  (2016)  of the  lost GDP  and  is calculated 
























Note: The above figure represents the comparable  international average  estimated loss in GDP due to military  
























Note: The above figure represents the comparable  international estimated sum of lost GDP  as of 2016 due 
to military  spending  calculated assuming  2% rate  of return (OECD  [2013]) and using the pooled OLS 
























Note: The above figure represents the comparable  international average  estimated loss in GDP due to military  
























Note: The above figure represents the comparable  international estimated sum of lost GDP  as of 2016 due 
to military  spending  calculated assuming  2% rate  of return (OECD  [2013]) and using the fixed effect estimation. 
The darker shaded regions indicate a higher estimated loss of GDP. 
